




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## Information Space as a Source and Result of Creating Myths

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### Abstract

The article deals with the analysis of the semantic content of the myth, which captures the perception and evaluation of Komsomolsk-on-Amur in the spatial and temporal aspects. It investigates how a myth is created, what components it consists of, how it interacts with the information space. The mechanisms of the myth emergence are fundamentally different. Their features are determined by the measure of artificiality or naturalness of creating myths. From the point of view of studying the specifics of global propaganda, artificially constructed myths are of special interest. The material for the study was the literary and journalistic texts created from different ideological positions, which document the nature of perceiving the city at various times of its existence. The article proposes a technique for analyzing and reconstructing a myth that can be used to work with different myths. It reveals the nature of the connection between mythological characteristics and reality. The content of the myth is described as a text consisting of five semantic complexes, formulated as statements. The first is the boundless breadth of space and its isolation from Russia. The second is that this space is not only uninhabited before the construction of the city, but completely deserted, lifeless. The third is that the space is inhabited by people who came here as hosts to build their city and settle there forever. The fourth is that the space was built by the Komsomol members, engaged in free prospective creative work and overcoming obstacles by their own will. The fifth is it is a space with no present. On the basis of the material presented in the paper, it is concluded that although its semantics differ significantly from the real characteristics of a particular space, the durability of the myth's existence is determined by the effectiveness of its promotion methods.

**Keywords:** information space, myth, propaganda, ideology, semantics, semantic complexes.

### 1. Introduction

The information space serves as a place for the generation of myths, which are both integral materially embodied texts, and abstract complexes that have no holistic fixation and consist of many individual texts representing some of its features. Myth can be fundamentally opposed to reality or reflect it in a transformed form; it can be false or true, natural or artificial, and so on.

Humans inherently love to compose myths and even whole fantastic worlds. They use facts from their past and present to create epics, pursuing existential, ideological, sociological, religious, pedagogical or other purposes. However, myths are not sustainable narrative forms. Researches of traditionally oral cultures show considerable flexibility in the structure of myths and the variability of their details. In addition, history also confirms that myths easily adapt to new cultural conditions and the changing realities of life. Despite the fact that the invention of writing gave a certain

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uniformity of content to a number of myths, it could not stop the process of transforming myths and mixing previously independent concepts.

Traditionally, a myth is defined as a story or idea that explains the culture or customs of a people. Often myths describe heroes or explain why a people revere the sun, or why elders should be respected. Myths are the motivating stories or ideas common cultural practices.

In the modern world, myths are no less important than real facts. This is indicated by the fact that they arise in different areas of human activity and are analyzed from the point of view of various sciences. As an example, this article provides materials of the researches on myth in its current forms.

## 2. Discussion

Modern science focuses on the content, functional and typological aspects of the myth. In this case, the first and third aspects, as a rule, are perceived as parameters that determine the specifics of broadcasting the second.

J.L. Ford (Ford, 2016) identifies four criteria of the myth: 1. in form it is a narration of sacred origin, 2. in content relating to the processes of the formation of the Universe, 3. intended to create a model of human activity, 4. in an ideological context. According to this perspective, he explores the dialectic of myth-making in modern cinema. The scientist believes that films, like any other narrative that meets these criteria, are forms of myth. As examples of contemporary myths, he cites such films as *Star Wars*, *Fisher King*, *Blade Runner*, *2001: Space Odyssey* and *The Matrix*. These films use familiar characters and motifs in new epic stories. Thus, *The Matrix*, according to J.L. Ford, combines metaphors from Greek mythology, Buddhism, Christianity, and even cyber technology, and it can be considered as an analysis of modern life. In this case, the film dialectically forms a new system of views on the world and the place of man, society and humanity in it.

The research of N.A. Khrenov (Khrenov, 2015) is also associated with the film-making of myths in Russia. From his point of view, the need of modern people to create for themselves a new "cultural hero" is associated with the loss of traditional culture by them. The sacral image of the ancestor personified a savior with rare abilities necessary to overcome extreme situations. The scientist believes that in the first half of the twentieth century, the epoch of revolutions, politics turned out to be a field for heroism, and political figures were cultural heroes. In the second half of the twentieth century, the demiurge of myth became a man of mass, endowed with a value system, which was formed by the power for the survival of the state. The works of art of that time told about the imaginary world in which the masses lived in the language of images, that is, the language of myths.

According to V.A. Lukov (Lukov, 2012), once having emerged, the myth is steadily fixed in culture, passing from one generation to another. This property of myths is used in Japanese schools, through the teaching of myths as the history of a people who appears fearless, wise, and moral in them. As a result, myths are laid in the basis of the formation of the Japanese national identity.

Thus, in this case, myth-making can be viewed as a process in which historical events are open to manipulation by both society and the state and aimed at shaping the outlook of the country's inhabitants and strengthening its national identity. Incidentally, myths act as ideas and stories that motivate people's everyday behavior.

The second area of myth-making can be called the field of international relations. In it, the media use historical analogies to justify the foreign policy of the state and simplify the task of explaining the meaning of current events.

In this regard, a collection of myths "Haunted by History: Myths in International Relations" (Buffet, Heuser, 1998) is of definite research interest. Let us dwell on one of the analyzed myths – the myth of Swedish neutrality. The author of the publication Ann-Sophie Dahl considers it from the point of view of her own definition of myth: "A myth is a universally held set of beliefs collected and repeated over some time which evokes a certain response and which includes a detachment from reality" (Buffet, Heuser, 1998: 31). In particular, she writes that the myth of neutrality actually means that Sweden could and can now protect itself without the help of other states, that is, without entering into any alliances. However, Sweden is a member of the European Union, a participant of the Partnership for Peace (an organization created by NATO for non-member countries) and an active observer in the Western European Union (an association established to coordinate defense).

In some cases, according to A. Best (Best, 2006: 812), “historical episodes are turned into shorthand clichés devoid of their original complexity.” As an example, the researcher examines the myth that Britain’s dissolution of the alliance with Japan in 1921 was a short-sighted blunder contributing to the outbreak of war in the Pacific region. He writes that at that moment the views on the need to extend the treaty were extremely controversial, but later it was forgotten, and the combination with Japan began to be perceived as an ideal of “old diplomacy”. A. Best argues that this was due to the fact that historians were primarily focused on the modern resonance of the historical myth.

Such a simplified interpretation of historical events leads to their accidental mythologization or deliberate falsification, which can seriously distort the mass historical consciousness. A number of scientists (Alekseev, Plotnikova, 2015) conducted a survey of experts to find out which period of Russian history is the most mythologized and which is the most falsified. As a result, it was established that the ancient epoch of the history of Russia was subjected to mythologization, and the Soviet period of history – to falsification in favor of contemporary political trends.

The work of M.K. Mendelson (Mendelson, 2010) suggests that the American immigration courts are sites where myths about the country’s national identity persist and are regularly reproduced. One of them is that America is “a nation of married, churchgoing parents raising English-speaking children” (Mendelson, 2010: 1049). The author cites statistics refuting every point of this thesis. Moreover, she claims that these images never reflected the reality of American life. To avoid deportation, immigrants retell a familiar myth, realizing that it is false. In our opinion, such myths are more like falsifications.

Thus, although myths are widely used for political purposes, they are, figuratively speaking, a double-edged sword (Janssen et al., 2012). That is, myths as attractive and promising tales can inspire people to act together. It is they that can be misleading and distort reality, since they are not necessarily true or based on convincing evidence.

Consequently, to the above definitions of the myth it is possible to add one more. Myth is an unsubstantiated presentation of the material without verifiable facts. Such an understanding of the myth has been revealed in several foreign scientific works, the description of two of them is given below.

The study of the factors influencing the exchange of knowledge between employees of public organizations (Bock, Kim, 2001) was based on the main propositions of the theory of social exchange theory, self-efficacy, and theory of reasoned actions. According to these theories, the most important incentive to share information is expected rewards. A survey of 467 employees of 75 departments of the four large public organizations in Korea led, in researchers’ judgment, to the destruction of this myth. The scientists have found that the determining factors for the people’s desire to share their knowledge are the expected improvement in relations with colleagues and the anticipated contribution to the perfection of the organization’s performance. On the contrary, the opportunity to receive an award prevents the formation of a positive attitude towards information exchange. Bock and Kim provided six reasons why rewards failed. The main one is the identity of reward and punishment in their punitive effect, since an expected but not received reward is perceived as a punishment.

A number of scientists (Janssen et al., 2012) studied the idea of open data, welcomed by a significant number of public organizations. Using the interview method, they identified five myths that were not supported by evidence, but were often encountered in the formulation of an organization’s policy. Among them, such as: all information must be published without any restrictions; each member of the organization can make use of this data; data disclosure will lead to open management of the organization. Janssen, Charalabidis and Zuiderwijk argue that although open data has the potential to ensure a number of benefits, publishing them entails many barriers. For example, by reading the minutes of city council meetings, people may lose confidence in the decision-making process and in the decisions themselves.

The functional aspects of myth-making are given priority attention in the following works, which consider the existence of myth in media texts. A.V. Fedorov defines a media text as “a message containing information and presented in any type and genre of media” (Fedorov, 2012: 260). According to the scientist, such texts are especially popular with the audience, because their authors satisfy the various needs of people of different intelligence, age and taste.

Media texts, as well as media communications in general, are in the process of constant transformations caused by technological innovation shifts in politics, economics, sociology and

communication. E. Tsymbalenko (Tsymbalenko, 2018) formulates several myths related to the ambivalence of mass communication, namely: convergence and divergence; universalization and personification; reality and virtuality and so on. He singles out the notion of “interactive media” as the greatest illusion, because the very digital nature of information exchange initially implies the interaction of man and machine.

Another myth related to the functioning of media texts is, according to C. Quail (Quail, 2012), a statement about the imminent death of traditional television and its digital migration. Using Canadian television as an example, she debunks the myths about the ubiquitous viewing of Internet television, audience activity and user control, and concludes that traditional television is still a multi-billion dollar industry, the main outlet of films, news, advertising and various programs.

S.S. Mehrizi and M. Khazaei (Mehrizi, Khazaei, 2017) believe that the Internet itself is also a myth because it allows a person to feel like a creator, able to originate or change any element in virtual space. He or she can be in several places at the same time, manage time, which is similar to tales of bodiless travels in time and space, and so on. That is, Internet technologies lay the foundation for the formation of mythical meanings and concepts that can challenge science.

V. Car (Car, 2008) supports this point of view and adds that it is the daily news that is the main means of creating and spreading myths in our day, although modern people are sure that they have long replaced myths with scientific knowledge. This does not mean that specific myths are explicitly written in media texts. By definition of a researcher, a myth is any story or story, the purpose of which is to explain the origin of something. Messaging is veiled in the story and its structure, and in the television news, in addition, in the picture and sound. The authors of these myths are journalists, although they may not consider themselves storytellers. Nevertheless, the difference between real events and their representation in media texts, in particular, in newspapers, is a proven fact (Shuneyko, Chibisova, 2018).

Advertising becomes another means of creating myths. For example, *Coca Cola*, which spent \$ 3.3 billion on advertising in 2013, convinces viewers that “all calories count” and people can drink their drinks if they work out (Malhotra et al., 2015). The authors argue that obesity is not associated with a lack of exercise, it is the result of an unhealthy diet, and they call for a ban on junk food advertising.

These studies sufficiently characterize the parameters of myth-perceiving in modern science, which seems to have semantically and thematically various types of effects on society. Any kind of activity is accompanied by mythologization. The more activity is relevant for society, the more stable myths accompany it. This is a natural process of mythologization. But besides it, there is still an artificial myth-making. According to the mechanism of myth formation, the natural and artificial processes are similar. But they can significantly differ in thematic variation and the frequency of myths. In particular, myth-making essentially depends on the state structure. For example, the totalitarian regime of the USSR produced mainly political myths. And it was in this area that it achieved significant success, that is, it created a number of long-term myths that continue to function to this day.

Any myth is reduced to one or more statements regarding the nature of an object. The formation of these statements occurs through using numerous communication channels, including various media resources. The process of formation itself is a multiple repetition of the same semantic complex. According to this view, the myths cited in this article comply with the general myth-making system.

Below is shown how the process of myth-making is carried out with reference to a specific object using the translation of the same information. The reconstruction carried out by the authors is useful from the point of view of explicating the mechanism, without clarifying the features of which it is impossible to consciously manage it.

### 3. Materials and methods

It should be emphasized that linguistic methods remain the most reliable and consistent ways to identify myths. One of them is a model of artistic reconstruction of a myth, in which the content of a myth is restored from the totality of texts devoted, one way or another, to its subject. These texts can be texts of various types of art in general, and texts of literary works in particular. To obtain a more correct result, the reconstruction is carried out on as many artistic, journalistic and epistolary works as possible. From the texts there extracted the entire set of direct and indirect

nominations of a particular object along with their accompanying assessments and intertextual links, which are then consistently summed up and generalized. The reconstructed myth is an abstract super textual formation created by the information space, independently existing in it and transforming this information space. The specific result of this work is presented in this article, which rebuilds the myth of Komsomolsk-on-Amur, a city that, according to the authors, is a full-format representative of the information space of the Khabarovsk Territory, and in some cases the entire Far East.

In order to detect the myth of Komsomolsk-on-Amur, an analysis was made of all the most significant media texts in which the city is the main or significant object of the narration. That is, it was investigated how the myth is recorded in the texts of different times by the authors with different ideological attitudes. In addition, these texts contrast significantly from each other in ways of presenting the material; they are created in different genres with different goals. All of these provide an ideal basis for finding the common features which are sustainably broadcast in most of them.

The analysis of all these media texts was subordinated to the task of identifying repeated semantic complexes that summarize certain characteristics of the city of Komsomolsk-on-Amur. As a result, there were sorted out five complexes, which in their totality constitute a myth. Each of them is considered below.

#### 4. Results

##### *The first semantic complex: the boundless breadth of space and its isolation from Russia*

This complex, as well as all subsequent ones, is noted, characterized and emphasized by the overwhelming number of authors touching on the topic. "In the Far East, they say 'close by' about a thousand kilometers" (Vail, 2003). "Somewhere on the map there were the names <...> Khabarovsk, Okha, Birobidzhan, Posyet, Nogayevo ... These points were lost in the vastness of the region" (Ketlinskaya, 1938). "From above, Adun (Amur) surprised even more by its wide overflow. <...> On both sides of the river, as far as the eye could see, there stretched taiga.... In its endless wilds ..." (Azhayev, 1948). If in the above examples P.L. Vail, V.K. Ketlinskaya and V.N. Azhayev emphasize nominative latitude, A.N. Arbuzov does it with an echo episode: "Ah well, into beeed!" (Arbuzov, 1940).

This vast space is so *Far from Moscow* (Azhayev, 1948), somewhere "near the hell out of nowhere" (Khlebnikov, 1978: 24), "in the middle of nowhere" (Arbuzov, 1940), that everything in it seems unfamiliar and strange: "Here it is, my unfamiliar land, / <...> / The sun shines differently, / the moon seems strange" (City..., 1972: 241), so strange and incomprehensible, as if it is separated from Russia, is not included in it, is outside of it. In this respect, the remark of L. Korneva, the heroine of A.N. Arbuzov's play, who asks Zorin: "Have you left anyone there in Russia?" (Arbuzov, 1940) is indicative. We are here and Russia is there; therefore, we are outside of Russia. Or the reasoning of Taras Ilyich from *Courage* by V.K. Ketlinskaya: "I used to dream – to Russia" (Ketlinskaya, 1938). The years did not change this view, but, on the contrary, they heightened the feeling of isolation from the rest of the country.

Although the city is located on the mainland, it seems to be something like a breakaway from the main massif and a drifting ice floe: "The giant piece of land comes off and drifts. This is not the peninsula of Crimea, there is no thin and therefore disturbingly noticeable Perekop: the gap is not apparent, but the drift is on" (Vail, 2003). The preservation of this complex even today, when globalization is gaining momentum, is due to the fact that the real topographic boundaries of the state and those subjectively perceived by its inhabitants often do not coincide with each other. The latitude and remoteness of the space amazes the Europeans, while for the Far East inhabitant "everything is near – Bryansk, Berlin, Brussels" (Vail, 2003) and flying to annual leave "to the West" is a common thing for many citizens of Komsomolsk-on-Amur.

*The second semantic complex: this space is not only unpopulated and inhabitable before the construction of the city, but also completely deserted and lifeless*

For example: "there is still nothing. An empty place" (Ketlinskaya, 1938); "I also did not imagine that there is nothing ... Not a single barrack" (City..., 1972: 240); "After all, there is nothing on the track, almost a bare place!" (Azhayev, 1948). This characteristic contradicts the real state of affairs, since Russians and Nanais already lived in this space – the city was built on the spot of a village and a nomad camp. The memorandum on the preparation of the construction site in the village of Permsky-on-Amur says that in the village of Permsky there are: "1. Residential buildings

consisting of 47 wooden houses with a total area of 2945 square meters. 2. Outbuildings – 5627 square meters” (City ..., 1972: 23). By the way, the village was founded in 1860 and at the time of the landing of the first builders it was already 72 years old.

Interestingly, this semantic complex of the myth with a slight adjustment to the low degree of liveliness of the city streets and its slow extinction is supported today. “As far as the eye can see, there is an asphalt steppe with a low growth of yellow buildings and a dozen tiny figures with string bags” (Vail, 2003). “Our city is a seriously wounded industrial center. It actively fights for its life” (Khoroshilov, 2012: 250). In 2016, V.I. Shport notes that “in seven years the city has lost 35 thousand people” (Sushchenko, 2017). Note that as of January 1, 2018, according to Rosstat data, available at [http://www.statdata.ru/largest\\_cities\\_russia](http://www.statdata.ru/largest_cities_russia), Komsomolsk-on-Amur was at 80th place in the hundred largest cities by population in Russia. In 2019, its population is 246.540 people, which classifies it as a big city even by world standards – small cities (up to 50.000 inhabitants), medium-sized (from 50,000 inhabitants), big (from 100.000 inhabitants), large (from 250.000 inhabitants).

The perception of the degree of liveliness of the inhabited space depends on the state of the architecture and the number of people on the street. Probably, in the Khabarovsk region it is always palpably smaller than in the European part. This effect is enhanced by the fact that in the provinces the overall pace of life is always slower, and the climate of Komsomolsk-on-Amur, equated to the regions of the Extreme North, is not always favourable for walks. It is important that the absence of people itself can be interpreted as a result of everyone being busy with work, and therefore people simply have no time to roam about the streets. But knowledgeable observers do not do it, being under the powerful grip of the myth of the information space of the city. Anyway, they reproduce a thousand-year-old stereotype: the fewest of all living people are in the cemetery, therefore, if there are few people on the street, the place looks like a cemetery; therefore, the seal of death constantly hangs above it.

Thus, if initially an uninhabited space is arrived in, now it becomes deserted due to being left. That is, being in opposite ideological positions and being separated from each other by more than half a century, various authors produce the same stereotype of perception: a place where there is no city yet, and a place where there is already a city is equally sparsely populated.

*The third semantic complex: the space is inhabited by people who came here as owners to build their city and settle in it forever*

Here is how V.K. Ketlinskaya describes it: “They were conquerors, Columbians. This land belonged to them”; “You will build a city, factories, life here...”; “It is necessary to settle down, get used to, fall in love” (Ketlinskaya, 1938).

As owners, the settlers occupied all residential buildings and outbuildings existing in the village of Permsky-on-Amur: “Engineers were accommodated in the houses, but Komsomol members did not pretend to rooms. Sheds, bathhouses, attics, barns, haylofts – everything was adapted for housing” (Ketlinskaya, 1938). At the same time the indigenous population becomes unwanted guests in their own house and they began to be forced out of the village. “I have nowhere to run. There is father's house on the bank. Now it is an office” (Arbuzov, 1940). That is, the fact that there were residents on the territory before the arrival of the first builders is not denied by the authors of the myth, but in so doing they are a priori deprived of the rights of the owners. From the point of view of standard ideas about civilization and humanistic norms, it is an unnatural and abnormal situation. Still, it is further complicated by the fact that migrants do not consider Komsomolsk-on-Amur to be their home; their home is the cities from which they came. That is, they, as a matter of fact, are not masters of space either, it is alien to them.

The absence of a master causes a barbaric attitude to the surrounding nature, when the taiga is perceived as a hostile force that must be fought: “... vast spaces occupied by endless taiga, <...>. They should not be glorified, but destroyed!” (Azhayev, 1948). “Taiga! / There seemed to be no end for it. / Boundless, severe, deaf, / It jealously met people – / The all-powerful gray mistress. / But that same year it had to retreat. / The settlers won a difficult battle” (City..., 1972: 243). Village buildings were also not particularly spared, because a new city was being built from scratch. According to M.A. Kuzmina, the church of St. John Chrysostom and the Holy Prophet Elijah functioned in the village of Permsky, which, with the arrival of builders, first became a canteen, then a militarized fire department. The church gradually collapsed, and by the mid-1960s disappeared completely (Kuzmina, 2007).

To settle down means to steady down, to start a family. “While the family business is not organized, it is not a city. <...> the family business is the most important now” (Ketlinskaya, 1938). “Girls in the Far East bring to the harsh and often hardened life something that ennobles, raises people, inspires them to new heroic deeds” (City..., 1972: 186). The great goal justifies the ultimate sexual freedom. Even ideologically seasoned works by V.K. Ketlinskaya, A.N. Arbuzov and V.N. Azhayev contain indications that extramarital sex during the construction of Komsomolsk-on-Amur was not just an ordinary thing; it was covered with romance of social transformations. “In our midst, unfortunately, such a philosophy is in circulation: ‘You should get into many relationships while you are young, otherwise years will pass and you will have nothing to remember ...’” (Azhayev, 1948). In Arbuzov’s play there is a large number of love affairs and only one mention of marriage, and it was made by a heroine in a way that leaves no doubt of the informality of the marriage. The same heroine in the final says: “Tell them that Finch will have a son” (Arbuzov, 1940). “Friends! Let me say – this is my bride. Guys! Bless us as Komsomol members” (Ketlinskaya, 1938).

In reality, the promised romance of love relationships and the ease of entering into marriage bonds turned sexual unfreedom for many of the 400 girls who arrived on May 10, 1937 in Komsomolsk-on-Amur, at the call of V. Khetagurova. In fact, the Khetagurov movement was a massive transfer of women from one region to another in order to meet the needs of men. I.L. Kuzina points out that the cases of coercion of girls to sex by officials, as well as cohabitation, polygamy, prostitution, the birth of illegitimate children were widespread (Kuzina, 2012). V. Merinov conveyed to the authors of the article the story of his own father about the specific type of slavery practiced in the first years of the city’s construction. On their arrival at the construction site, young girls were taken their passports away from them with the words: “You will get it back two years later after you have two children”. So girls were turned not just into sexual slaves, but into instruments of compulsory reproduction of the population. Honored artist of Russia N. Ivleva, an eyewitness to the events, in one of her canvases portrayed two girls who donned their best dresses and went to drown because their value system did not imply any other response to the sexual abuse they suffered. I. Kuzina, V. Merinov, N. Ivleva, not being familiar with each other, cite various facts of mass cases of gender-oriented sexual and social lack of freedom that was common in the middle of the 20th century in the process of socialist construction.

These facts require at least three comments. In the myth, they are reflected in the semantic complex of social emancipation. The very vocalization of this complex does not just substantially smooth the essence of the problem, which it reflects in a transformed form, but replaces it with another. The word freedom turns its antonym – slavery.

Not everyone managed to take up residence in the city, and the space is full of people who dreamed and dream of escaping from it. “The living conditions of the first builders were incredibly difficult. <...> By the end of 1932, 800 people were fugitives and 300 died from diseases. The number of builders was drastically reducing” (Kuzmina, 2007). From the information posted on the site [http://города-россия.рф/sity\\_id.php?id=75](http://города-россия.рф/sity_id.php?id=75), it follows that from 1993 to the present the number of city residents has been steadily decreasing: 2006 – 273.300 people, 2009 – 270.962 people, 2012 – 260.257 people, 2015 – 253.030 people, 2018 – 248.254 people, and 2019 – 246.540 people.

*The fourth semantic complex: the space was built by members of the Komsomol, engaged in free perspective creative work and overcoming obstacles of their own accord*

Their main characteristic is youth, adolescent enthusiasm and mobility. They are constantly in the team, which shares, in one way or another, their aspirations. Their creative activity does not exist in isolation from others, since it cannot be carried out individually. For example, “young workers were rather casual about their tariffs. They didn’t care much for their earnings: there was enough for the meal, they have a padded jacket, and the hostel was free. What else does one want? If only the city grew faster. Here it is a real payment for labor and deprivation! <...> We, the Komsomol members, looked at the lovers of the “easy money” as if they were socially ill” (Khlebnikov, 1978: 53). Or V.N. Azhayev’s statement “... this is the basis of everything – loyalty to the Motherland and the party, readiness to sacrifice privacy, even life, if a duty requires” (Azhayev, 1948) and that of V.K. Ketlinskaya “She (Tonya) on no account agreed to leave this male work which was unbearable for her. At times she was so tired that she wanted to drop and fall asleep right there. But she restrained herself by an effort of will, and her eyes were burning with pride” (Ketlinskaya, 1938).

This semantic complex, like others which were aggressively implanted in the minds of the inhabitants by the communist propaganda, is the most stable and designed for centuries. Already on December 10, 1932, the city was officially formed and named Komsomolsk in honor of the first builders, Komsomol members. The inscription on the memorial stone, opened in 1967 in the Square of Youth, reads “Here the first Komsomol members, the builders of the city, landed on May 10, 1932” (the stone is under state protection as a historical monument). In 1967, a sculpture “To Komsomol members of the 30s” was installed near the Youth House, which, according to the idea of its author A.N. Tumanov, should create “the impression that Komsomol members stand firmly on the ground, which they will have to settle in” (Kuzmina, 2007). In 1981, at number 19, there was fixed a memorial plaque with the text: “The street was named Komsomolskaya to commemorate heroic work and courage shown by the Komsomol members and young people during the construction of the city.” In 1982, a monument to the First Builders was erected on the Amur Embankment with five-meter bronze figures of young people on a three-meter pedestal.

This semantic complex is deeply false. In reality, the dominance of involuntary resettlement and servitude was a characteristic of the described information space from the very beginning.

As M.A. Kuzmina (Kuzmina, 2007) testifies, forced builders were brought to the great constructions of the Stalinist five-year plans located around Komsomolsk from all the Union republics. The first echelon brought 500 civilian and recruited workers and 300 mobilized Komsomol members to organize work on marking and building a construction site. In total, the Komsomol members arrived at Dalpromstroy amounted to about two and a half thousand, and at Aviastroy – one and a half.

In December 1932, Dallag (Far Eastern Corrective Labor Camp, GULAG unit) was ordered to urgently prepare fifteen thousand prisoners to be sent to Komsomolsk: the use of forced labor in the construction of industrial facilities in the country was envisaged by the plans of the camp system. The ship “Liberty” brought three thousands of them to the city in the spring of 1933. Besides, thousands of peasant families were resettled from the Amur Region to Komsomolsk in the summer of 1933. From 1933 to July 1941, military service personnel worked in the construction of the city, the number of which in different years ranged from 6 to 12,5 thousand. In 1940, 4,000 prisoners worked in the excavation, uprooting and sites of Martenstroy, Vodokanalstroy, Grazhdanstroy. On January 1, 1946, in the territory of Komsomolsk-on-Amur there were about 15,000 Japanese prisoners of war who, according to P. Vail, built the best and most durable houses in the city (Vail, 2003).

This part of the semantic complex “someone will arrive, will come and will help, will do”, that is, the habit of solving problems not at the expense of the city’s resources, but with the help of re-deploying them from outside, was so strong that in 2012 the former first secretary of Komsomolsk-on-Amur CPSU Committee wrote: “What if the circumstances change in such a way that Russia urgently begins to create conditions in the Far East for the resettlement of families from the central part of the country. And we have a piano in the bushes! There are finished construction sites in the center of the city” (Khoroshilov, 2012: 254). In 2016, the situation does not change: “When we created TOSEDs (territories of advanced socio-economic development), we relied on Komsomolsk, but were surprised to find that investors are not in a hurry to go there” (Sushchenko, 2017).

It should be emphasized that even a small percentage of civilian workers who took part in construction, according to the nature of their involvement in the production process, cannot be called free in the full sense of the word. We quote the heroes of V.K. Ketlinskaya (Ketlinskaya, 1938). Morozov: “You made contracts here. For a year, for two. Nonsense!” Kruglov: “How can I tell them they should not return home either after a year or two; that from now on their homeland is an unfamiliar, stern, uninhabited land?” Granatov: “ is it possible to rebuild a life without victims? <...> Yes, this city will grow on bones ...”

Despite a complete separation from reality, with its positive lines, the myth of the construction of Komsomolsk-on-Amur by young people who selflessly create the city of their dreams despite the cold, hunger and disease turns out to be a sought-after brand that resonates with dreams of disinterested inspired work. Thus it turns out to be text in which the next generations want to believe. The same myth was one of the semantic foundations of the stereotype existing outside of the Far East that Far Eastern residents are courageous people capable of overcoming any obstacles.



*The fifth semantic complex: a space in which there is no present*

In accordance with this semantic complex, the future immediately turns into the past. This is a rather sinister characteristic, given that all the creative processes associated with the self-consciousness of the individual can be carried out only in the present. Denying the significance or even the very fact of the presence of the present, the myth reconstructed from media texts turns the entire space of the city into a fictitious zone, where one can recollect or dream, but nothing can be done now, because there is simply no now today, it is replaced by missing memories or unformed dreams. Both cannot be verified, because, they are over without coming.

Not by chance, the most different authors, giving a general description of the city, in principle, do not mention the present. “My city of youth, I honor / Your past and future – / Memories and dreams’ (City...,1972: 304). But if the present nevertheless arises, it turns out to be filled not with real activity, but with dreams, which are characterized as utopia. The character of A.N. Arbuzov wants to erect a monument in the city not to anyone, but to the great utopian Foma Campanella (Arbuzov, 1940). P.L. Vail calls a chapter of his travel notes devoted to the city “On the Avenue of Utopia” (Vail, 2003). The builders of the city are not called creators or makers, but dreamers: “It would be boring without such dreamers with their indomitable faith in the fulfillment of their dreams. Vying with each other, we fabricated new sights of the avenue in our imagination” (Khlebnikov, 1978: 157).

The sample of the deformed perception of time was recorded in the poem “History of Komsomolsk” by N. Glazkov (Glazkov, 1963). It ends with the lines: “That city which is young, / Looks like a mature city!” The lines are clearly polemic against official propaganda. The “City of Youth” at the time when there were no external causes of aging was called “mature”. In Russian, this word is used as a steady euphemism for the word “old”. In other words, this text says that the city of youth did not have youth; it leapt immediately to maturity-senility. With these lines, N. Glazkov does not just show his attitude to the official ideology and translates one of the semantic complexes of the myth. He predicts the fragility of the symbolic image imposed by propaganda.

The perception of the city not as a real object, but as an unfulfilled dream remains to our time. “If the restructuring of the economy did not proceed at a destructive pace, our city would have come to its present maturity as truly courageous and beautiful with original modern architecture, filled with greenery and spaciousness. It would be a regional center. The city would have new institutions, theaters, palaces, schools and kindergartens, objects of commerce, consumer services, intellectual purposes and much more. A transport hub would connect us with the world. If only ...” (Khoroshilov, 2012: 253). A similar perception can be found in any nostalgic article of a communist-oriented author.

The deformed perception of time, apart from the exclusion of the present and the identification of the future and the past, presupposes a complete lack of perspective progress. It is replaced in the space of myth by an endless running in a circle in which the same cycles constantly duplicate each other, and there is a need to repeat them. “People should know that they will have a good and comfortable living environment. And we have to create it practically from scratch” (Sushchenko, 2017). “Komsomolsk-on-Amur, which celebrates its 85th anniversary this year, is experiencing an industrial boom for the third time in its life. The first, in the 1930s, is well known from history books. The second rise occurred in the 80s of the last century. And now, in the 21st century, the City of Youth is again approaching its original purpose – to become the industrial center of the Far East. And the government of the Khabarovsk Territory established a special post of the deputy chairman of the government for the development of Komsomolsk-on-Amur” (Kalinina 2017).

The false landmarks of the future, replacing each other, set a complete lack of perspective, because they repeat the landmarks of the past. Thus, the movement to the future turns out to be a return to the past, the movement to which escapes the point of the present. It is significant in this respect that, until recently, the wall of the House of Youth was decorated with a copper plate with the inscription that in the niche under the plate on October 29, 1968, the Komsomol members of the City of Youth laid a memorable letter to the young generation of 2018. This memorial object was a landmark of the future. But it disappeared before this future came, that is, the future became the past without coming and bypassing the present stage.

## 5. Conclusion

All these semantic complexes do not exist by themselves, but as was shown above, contradict reality; the dominant characteristic of a myth is a lie. For this reason, its influence on society is extremely destructive. On the other hand, its persistence raises questions about how effective the old tried-and-true propaganda techniques are.

The myth created by the ideologically oriented information space withstands conflict with reality, but does not withstand conflict with time. In modern times, it is not destroyed; it is not replaced by another myth. It just dies. It gradually disappears with the same inevitability, as monuments of the Soviet period of history disappear from the streets. This allows making the assumption that a myth, created by an ideologically oriented information space, cannot effectively exist without the constant support of this space. It essentially depends on ideology, which is the background that ensures its integrity. As soon as the background disappears, the components become separate disputed characteristics and dissipate, lose their semantic integrity and are perceived by native speakers as historical oddities. Such dynamics of the interaction of myth with reality is largely connected with the change in the breadth of its distribution – the actual cessation of the broadcast. But despite this, as a powerful factor of the historical past, which somehow preserves its relevance, such a myth requires debunking in terms of establishing historical justice.

The myth in question is one of many similar, inherited from the domination of communist ideology. Debunking such myths is a global humanitarian task, which Russian society has already begun to implement. It seems that the myth reconstruction model implemented in this study can be effectively used to recreate and analyze any of the myths.

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